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IIntroduction
Of all the problems which have perplexed European
diplomats since the Napoleonic wars, the greatest has perhaps
been that of the Near East. The rapid decline of the Turkish
power in the nineteenth century and the corresponding rise of
nationalism in the possessions of the Sultan, caused many-
complications into which the great powers of Europe felt im-
pelled to interfere. Since all of the great powers - France,
Prussia, Austria, Russia, and Great Britain - had important
issues at stake in the fate of the Turkish Empire, it can readily
be surmised that these powers took an active hand in determin-
ing the course of events.
In order that no one country should gain a predominant
influence in Oriental affairs, a concert of all the powers was
organized. This concert consisted of the ambassadors from the
various countries to Turkey. The ambassadors possessed no legal
power to enforce their opinions upon the Sultan, but the in-
fluence of the countries behind them practically forced the
Porte to accept their recommendations. This collective author-
ity on the part of the powers in the solution of the Eastern
Question has been exercised tentatively since 1836 and system-
1
atically since 1856.
During the struggle of the Greeks for independence
in the early twenties, the conservative Holy Alliance opposed to
1. Holland, T, E. , The European Concert in the Eastern Question ,
Introduction, p. 2.

2its fullest peaceful powers the success of the movement. In
1825, however, Alexander of Russia died and with him practically
ended the power of the Holy Alliance. Greece had meanwhile
appealed to England for help, so in 1826 a protocol was signed
by the representatives of Russia and England stating the terms
upon which they wished to mediate between the Porte and Greece.
Greece was to secure a practical independence with only a small
supervisory power exercised by the Sultan. These terms the
Sultan refused to accept. France joined England and Russia
in their position in 1827.
3
The Porte persisted in its refusal
to accept the terms laid down by the powers. Coercive measures
were adopted, however, and in 1832 the Sultan submitted. He
received an indemnity of forty million Turkish piastres for the
loss of Greece. The boundaries of Greece as determined by the
agreement of 1832 endured for almost half a century.
Almost immediately after the struggle with the Greeks
was ended the Porte became engaged in war with his Pasha of
Egypt, Mehemet Ali. Mehemet Ali was successful in the brief
struggle and would in all probability have captured
Constantinople but for the assistance given to the Sultan
by Russia. As it was, Mehemet Ali received the governorship
of Egypt, Candia, and Syria and his son the collectorship of
3
Adana, at the Convention of Kutayeh, May 14, 1833. On
1. Holland, T. E. , The European Concert in the Eastern Question,
p. 5.
2. Ibid., p. 7.
3. Ibid., p. 89,

3July 8, 1833, an alliance was concluded "between Turkey and Russia.
This action of Russia gave great offence to the other powers
1
as it threatened to overthrow the concert.
In 1838 the Pasha of Egypt reopened the war upon Turkey
and soon had the Sultan completely at his mercy. The Great
Powers determined to interfere collectively to restore the
power of Turkey and prevent Russia from acting alone. Repre-
sentatives of Great Britain, France, Prussia, Austria, and
Russia met at London and sent the Sultan a note asking him to
make no move for peace before consulting them. ' In the Treaty
of London, July 15, 1840, the Allied Powers agreed to force
Mehemet Ali to accept the terms they laid down. These terms
were: (l) Mehemet Ali and his successors were to have the
administration of the Pashalic of Egypt; (2) he was to have the
administration of the northern part of Syria for life; (3) he
3
must accept these terms within ten days. France disagreed
in this policy but the other powers acted without her. Mehemet
Ali at first refused to agree to these provisions but after the
capture of Acre by the allies he agreed to make peace. On
December 11, 1840, Mehemet Ali accepted the terms, by this time
more severe, by which he was to be the hereditary ruler of
4
Egypt,but had to evacuate Syria, Candia, and Arabia,
The successful settlement of the affairs of Greeoe
and Egypt showed the power of the European Concert in Turkish
affairs. It was now securely established and was certain to be
1. Holland, T. E. , The European Concert in the Eastern Question ,
2. Ibid., p. 90. 3. Ibid, p. 98. 4. Ibid, p. 98.

4the means adopted to attempt to settle the Eastern Question,
In 1856 the systematic authority of the European
Concert "began to be exercised. In 1853 the discontent of the
Christians under Turkish rule, and the misgovernment of the
Sultan gave Russia a chance to intercede as the champion of
orthodoxy. Russia declared war upon Turkey, but the other
powers were unwilling to have Russia profit at the expense of
Turkey. They assisted Turkey in the Crimean war and Russia
was defeated. The Treaty of Paris (1856) ended the struggle.
This treaty is a negation of the right of any one power, and
an assertion of the right of the Powers collectively, to solve
1
the Eastern Question.
The Treaty of Paris was later superseded in part
by the Treaty of Berlin, but the following provisions were
permanent: (l) the Sultan was admitted to the membership of
the Concert; (2) mediation was to be resorted to before any
of the powers should declare war upon the Porte; (3) the Black
Sea was to be neutralized; (4) the Danube was to be free for
all navigation; (5) the independence and territorial integrity
of Turkey was recognized and guaranteed by the powers, and they
renounced all claim on their part, separately or collectively,
to intervene in her internal affairs. This provision was made
because the Porte had guaranteed generous treatment to his
subjects in a firman . When the Sultan later refused to live
up to his promise, the powers in their turn began to interfere.
1. Holland, T. E. , The European Concert in the Eastern Question,
p. 191.
2. Ibid., Treaty of Paris, pp. 204-210.

5Between 1856 and 1875 there was very little trouble
in the Near East. A dispute as to whether Greece or Turkey
should rule over the Ionian islands was taken up by the Concert,
but the affair did not reach a crisis until after the Treaty
of Berlin,
In 1875, however, the Eastern Question entered again
upon an acute phase. The Slavic subjects of Turkey were very
discontented under Turkish rule. They were overburdened with
taxation and the examples of the countries around them made them
desire to possess independence. There was also a very bitter
feeling of social and religious hatred between the Slavs and the
Turks. 1 In the summer of 1875 Herzegovinia revolted. The
Powers were not united in their demands for a settlement, and
as the movement was not stamped out it spread repidly. Early
in 1876 the Christians in Bulgaria revolted. They were put down
with fearful atrocities. All Europe was aroused by the cruelty
of the Turks, and Servia and Montenegro declared war on Turkey.
Russia became intensely interested in the struggle of the Slavs,
and when diplomacy failed to settle the crisis, she declared
3
war on Turkey, April 24, 1877. The Turks were defeated in the
war, and terms of peace were drawn up at San Stefano.
The terms of the Treaty of San Stefano were unsatis-
factory to all the countries except Russia and Bulgaria.
England demanded a revision of the treaty, and the Congress of
Berlin met on July 13, 1878, to draw up new terms. Russia
1. Hazen, C. D. , Europe since 1815 , p. 620.
2. Ibid., p. 624.

6protested against the other Powers* dictating terms of peace in a
war in which they had taken no part, but the powers were determin-
ed not to permit Russia to settle the Eastern Question by herself.
The principal provisions of the Treaty of Berlin,
July 13, 1878, were as follows-.
1
(l) Montenegro, Servia, and
Roumania were rendered completely independent of Trukey; (2)
Austria secured Bosnia and Herzegovinia; (3) Russia was given
Bessarabia and part of Turkish Armenia; (4) Cyprus was added to
England by Turkey; (5) Bulgaria was divided into several parts:
Eastern Roumelia was still to be sub-ect to the Sultan's rule,
Macedonia was to be autonomous under a Christian governor appoint-
ed by the Porte, and Bulgaria proper was to be only slightly
dependent upon the Pcrte; (6) the admittance of the Sultan to the
European Concert was reaffirmed. "Their Majesties engage, each on
his part, to respect the independence and territorial integrity of
the Ottoman Empire, and guarantee in common the strict observance
of that engagement; and will in consequence consider any act tend-
ing to its violation as a question of general interest."
2 (?)
Turkey was to cede to Greece Thessaly and a part of Epirus.
This was not done by the Sultan until 1881 and then only under
compulsion. (8) Crete still remained a dependency of Turkey but
the Porte agreed to apply scrupulously the Organic Laws of 1864
with such modifications as might be considered equitable.
The Treaty of Berlin by no means solved the Eastern Ques
ticn, but it arranged affairs to the best of its makers' ability.
1. Holland, T. E., The European Conc ert in the Eastern Question,
Treaty of Berlin, July 13, 1878, pp. 244-256.
2. Ibid., Article VII, p. 250.

There were many phases left open and some of its provisions
were so unsatisfactory to the Balkan countries that they were
certain to be overthrown when the opportunity presented itself.
In 1885 Eastern Roumelia and Bulgaria united in a bloodless
revolution and practically threw off the yoke of Turkey.
We may now turn back again to the affairs of Egypt.
Egypt was comparatively quiet between 1840 and 1873, but because
of inefficient management of financial affairs the government
became almost bankrupt. Between 1873 and 1879 the Powers
gained a greater control over Egypt than that exercised by
either the Sultan or the Khedive, This was due to the
enormous loans contracted by the Khedive. The Powers obtained
many rights by enforcing the claims of their subjects in the
international courts. In 1875 the Khedive sold his shares in the
Suez Canal to the British government , and Great Britain began
to exercise a dual control over Egypt with France. These two
countries took charge of the revenues of Egypt in an indirect
way, and practically dictated the policies of the government,
although they appointed no officials.
In the summer of 1883 a revolution broke out in
Egypt which France refused to help in suppressing. England
suppressed the revolution and took exclusive charge of affairs
in Egypt. By a decree of January 18, 1883, dual control in
Egypt was abolished.' England was not, however, the only power
1. Hazen, C, D. , Europe since 1815 . p. 629.
2. Holland, I. E. , The European Concert in the Eastern Question,
p. 109.
3. Ibid-, p. 108.

8which had financial interests in Egypt, and the other powers
insisted upon having some voice in the management of financial
affairs. On December 11, 1884, Russia and Germany insisted
upon having a member on the Commission of the Caisse, which
controlled the financial action of the Khedive's government.
This was agreed to, and it was further arranged that the Suez
Canal was to be free to all nations.
1
With this last phase of
the Egyptian question settled, the Powers had some rest from the
intricacies of the Eastern Question. It was not until the
Armenian massacres of the early nineties that any further
serious crisis developed, but from that time until 1908 the
Powers were busily engaged with problems which appeared in
rapid succession.
1. Holland, T. E., The European Concert in the Eastern Question ,
p. 109.

II
The Armenian Massacres.
Although the history of Turkey contains many tragic
events, probably the most horrible of all is the terrible
persecution of the Armenians. The Armenians are discontented
under the Turkish rule and because of this and their belief
in Christianity they are made the subject of wholesale
massacres at every opportunity.
In 1895 the population of Armenia was about two
million people. The Armenians are an Indo-European race and
very highly civilized. They were civilized long before the
birth of Christ and have the distinction of being the first
people to establish Christianity as the religion of their
state. The Armenians have always been anxious to acquire ed-
ucation, and the suppression of their schools by the Turks
forms one of their bitterest objections to Turkish rule.
Armenian schools were suppressed by orders of the Sultan and
in some provinces the people were forbidden to speak in their
native language.
This and many other minor persecutions caused the
Armenians to organize small revolts from time to time. These
were easily put down and cruelly punished by the Turks and
the Kurds (a neighboring race). As Russia was opposed to
1. Pears, Sir Edwin, Forty Years in Constantinople, p. 150.

intervention in the internal affairs of Turkey, and England
was too far away to interfere, the Sultan pursued a free hand
with his subjects*
In 1895 Abdul Hamid, then Sultan of Turkey, determined
to extinguish the whole race, or make them conform to the
Moslem religion. Elaborate plans were made for a general
massaore of the Christian Armenians and it is very probable
that Abdul Hamid was the author of them.
1
Precautions were
taken by the authorities at Constantinople to prevent news of
the massacres of the interior from leaking out. Every letter
sent to or coming from Asia Minor was opened. Foreigners as
well as Turkish subjects were forbidden to go into Armenian
provinces, and the system of local passports was very strictly
enforced. Armenians were forbidden passports under all
conditions.
With these precautions taken, emissaries were sent
to the provinces to tell the Moslems that they were at liberty
to take the property of the Christian Armenians and kill them
if they resisted. 3 The suggestion was quickly followed by the
Turks and Kurds. Terrible massacres were perpetrated all over
Armenia. Thousands were brutally murdered and many others
died from exposure and hardship. The lowest serious estimate
1. Pears, Sir Edwin, Forty Years in Constantinople , p. 150.
This view is taken by almost all contemporary writers of the
period. Earl of Meath, John Burns, Professor Salmini, etc.
2. Ibid., p. 156.
3. Ibid., p. 157.

of the number killed during these massacres is placed at one
hundred thousand, but it is probable that Sir William Ramsey
1 ©
1
estimate of a quarter of a million is more nearly correct.
The terrible barbarities .with which these massacres
were carried out are almost unbelievable. At Birajek, a village
in Armenia, a Turkish officer asked the Armenians to give up
their arms and he would defend them. They did so, and were
all murdered like sheep without the Turkish off leers' making
a move of resistance to those who attacked them. At the
Cathedral of Urfa on December 29, 1896 occured perhaps one of
the most cruel outrages of the whole fiendish affair. The
Armenians were led to believe that they would not be molested in
the cathedral, but when about three thousand people had collected
there, the Turks fell upon them and slaughtered or burned every
soul.
The measures taken by the Sultan to prevent the news
of the massacres from reaching the outside world were partially
successful, but gradually the accounts of conditions in Armenia
spread in Europe. Great outcries arose in England, America,
and other countries against these massacres and the newspapers
3
of England demanded immediate action.
During the period of the Armenian massacres, Sir
1. Pears, Sir Edwin, Forty Years in Constantinople, p. 159.
2. Ibid., p. 160.
3. London Times, 1896.

Philip Currie was Ambassador from England to Turkey. He
acquitted himself well in this crisis and did all that was
possible to stop the massacres. He induced most of his
colleagues in the European Concert to join him in representations
to the Sultan, and while the massacres were not entirely
discontinued the action of the Concert undoubtedly limmited them.
When the first outbreak of hostility against the
Armenians began in November, 1895, Sir philip Currie was away
on a leave of absence from Constantinople and Mr. Michael
Herbert was Charge d ' Affaires .
2
He inaugurated a very strong
policy which Sir Philip later followed. Mr. Herbert succeeded,
after a great deal of persuasion, in obtaining the consent of
the other Ambassadors to send the following open telegram to
the Sultan. Sir Edwin Pears quotes the text of it from memory
as follows,- "This thing must cease immediately or there will
be danger to the throne and dynasty." The sting of this
message lay in the last word, and as the Concert represented
so strong a front, the massacres were immediately stopped.
1. Sir Philip Currie was a fine specimen of a well trained
English Diplomat (Pears, p. 149). He had a great deal of
diplomat c experience before becoming Ambassador to Turkey.
From 1876 to 187? he was Secretary to Lord Salisbury in
Constantinople and to the Berlin Congress. Later he was
Permanent Secretary for Foreign Affairs. He was the Ambassador
to Turkey January 1, 1894 to April 1, 1898.
2. Pears, Sir Edwin, Forty Year s in Constantinople , p. 165.
3. Ibid., p. 165.
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In order to clear himself of all blame in this affair
Abdul Hamid appointed a commission to investigate the causes of
the massacres. 1 The commission was almost entirely made up of
servants of the Sultan, so its report would have been of no value
whatever. It did not, however, even make a report.
Outbreaks against the Armenians continued during 1895
and 1896 in the outlying districts, despite all protests. The
various European powers could not agree upon a cooperative plan
to force the Sultan to stop them, and Abdul Hamid took advantage
of the dissension in the Concert to do as he pleased.
In the summer of 1896 a group of Armenians in
Constantinople. 2 These conspirators were skillfully permitted
to perfect their plan by the Sultan, who rightly surmised that
their action would arouse the Turks against the Armenians, and
3
cause them to exact terrible vengeance.
On the night of August 26, 1896, a small band of
Armenians attacked the Ottoman bank and captured it with little
resistance. They maintained possession of it until daybreak,
4
when they quietly evacuated it. The ease with which this plan
was accomplished added further grounds to the belief that Abdul
Hamid must have known all about the conspiracy. It seems
impossible that his elaborate network of spies whould have
1. Fears, Sir Edwin, Forty Years in Constantinople , p. 167.
2. Miller, W., The Ottoman Empire 1801-1S1S , p. 430.
3. Pears, Ibid., p. 168.
4. Ibid., p. 162.
I
failed to discover any inkling of this plot. Then too, on the
night of the attack, the bank was lightly guarded, and every
detail favored its success.^
The outbreak of the Armenians in Constantinople caused
tremendous excitement in the capital. The Turks were infuriated
^
and an organized massacre of all Christian Armenians began. It
seemed as if the Moslems were determined to kill every Armenian
p
in the city. The Turkish officers offered no resistance to
the mob and even seemed to encourage their barbarities. Sir
Edwin Pears, in his memoirs of his life in Turkey, goes so far
as to say that the Turks of the interior were offered the shops
3
of the Armenians that were killed.
For several days affairs were in terrible confusion
in Constantinople and thousands of Armenians were massacred
with frightful cruelty. The only way in which the Armenians
could save their lives was to adopt the Moslem religion. The
Turks sought their victims everywhere and did not hesitate to
invade the houses of English, French, or German citizens to seek
Armenian servants. Men were massacred before the very doors
of the embassies of the great powers. It is estimated that over
six thousand people were killed in this horrible carnage.
4 It
was only after the ambassadors of the Powers sent a very strongly
worded note to the Sultan and threatened the use of force, that
the massacre was stopped.
1. Pears, Sir Edwin, Forty Years in Constantinople , p. 163.
3. Miller, W., The Ottoman Empire 1801-1913 , p. 430.
3. Pears., Ibid, p. 163.
4. Miller., Ibid, p. 430.
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A great wave of public indignation swept over England
and France at the perpetration of these outrages in the very
capital of the Turkish Empire, and the last doubts of the
authenticity of the early accounts of Armenian massacres were
swept away. The London Times of September 9, 1896 came out with
the following headlines,- "Constantinople Riots. Further Details
of Massacres. Six Thousand Defenseless People Murdered",- and
in its editorial columns strongly urged the use of drastic
measures with Abdul Hamid.
1
The English people felt that they
should protect the unfortunate Armenians and that the government
had hardly lived up to its obligations,
Gladstone came out again before the public, and in a
speech at Liverpool on behalf of the Armenians branded Abdul
Hamid as "the Great Assassin". Such men as Rev. R. J. Rogers,
the Earl of Meath, John Burns, and Professor H. A. Salmons, all
were unanimous in stating that some active action by the govern-
ment was essential to stop the massacres, and save the good name
of England. Professor Salmone stated the only solution of the
problem was the deposition of Abdul Hamid by the Powers, and the
recognition of the Young Turks.
3 In France the sentiment was
also very strong for some decisive action, and French writers
„
4
branded Abdul Hamid as the "Red Sultan".
No steps were taken by the Powers, however, to punish
the Sultan for his part in the massacres. This was due to the
lack of harmony and co8peration of the members of the Concert.
1. London Times, September 9, 1896, p. 7,
2. Earl of Meath, "Armenian Massacres", Nineteenth Century, vol. 4U
3. Salmone, Professor H. A., "The Armenian Massacres", Ibid, p. 672
4. Pears, Sir Edwin, Forty Years in Constantinople , P. 168.

The English ambassador was ready from the beginning to interfere,
forcibly if necessary, but was prevented from doing so by the
other countries.* Germany was anxious for concessions in Asia
Minor and acted as the protector of Abdul Hamid. She not only
refused to interfere herself but restrained England from doing
oo 380 •
The action of Germany during this crisis is not very
commendable. Even while the massacres were going on, the
Germans in Turkey refused to give the Armenians any assistance,
although Marschall von Bieberetein, the German ambassador, and
others expressed, in private, their loathing of the actions of
the Turks.4 The Germans felt it was for the interest of their
own country not to interfere.
Of the other countries in the Concert, France was
the only one to cooperate with England. The French ambassador
advocated the sending of a fleet to Constantinople as the only
5
means of intimidating the Sultan. Russia also, through its
ambassador, Lobanov, declared that she did not desire the
creation of a state in Asia Minor which would be similar to
gBulgaria in Europe.
With three of the members of the Concert opposed to
interference with the Sultan, it can easily be seen that effect-
ive action to stop the Armenian outrages was very difficult.
1. Pears, Sir Edwin, Forty Years in Constantinople , p. 168.
2. Miller, W., Ottoman Empire 1801-1913 , p. 431.
3. Baron Marschall von Bieberstein was a very painstaking man and
an admirable ambassador. In any matter which he took up he al-
ways made himself master of all the facts and then forced a
solution of the problem. He always heard the opinions of all
men in regard to political matters and so was always well
informed. He was the German Ambassador to Turkey during the
whole period from 1695 to 1908.
4. Pears, Ibid, p. 170. 5. Nineteenth Century V. 40, p. 669.
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Lord Salisbury, again in power in England, solemnly and publicly
warned Abdul Hamid of the consequences of his misgdvernment, and
suggested the eventual necessity of employing fores.
1 The Sultan
paid little heed to this warning and there was a general feeling
among the English people that England could and should have act-
ed with more vigor. It is probably true that she might have
helped the Armenians more, but we must consider that the action
of the other countries in the Concert made it very difficult.
As a whole, it must be acknowledged that the action of
the European Concert during the Armenian massacres was anything
but commendable. It stopped only the most conspicuous and
widely published atrocities, and these only after some delay.
The lack of cooperation among the powers was the cause of this
weak policy, for Abdul Hamid was aware of the situation and
planned his own policy in accordance. The great weakness of the
Concert was clearly demonstrated during this crisis, but in the
events which followed it showed up to better advantage.
The suffering of the Armenians was not ended after the
affair at Constantinople, but the rapidly approaching climax
of the affairs of Crete supplanted Armenia in the attention of
the Powers. They were forgotten until the massacres at Adana in
1909 brought them once more before the public eye.
1. Miller, W., The Ottoman Empire 1801-1913 , p. 432.
3. Nineteenth Century, Volume 40, p. 674.

Ill
The Cretan Question.
By the Treaty of Berlin in 1878, the island of Crete
was left under the rule of the Sultan, although he was forced
to grant certain reforms. The Pact of Halipa, signed in
October, 1878, granted these reforms and marks the high water
mark of Ottoman concessions to Crete. This Pact provided that
the Governor General of the island should hold office for five
years, and should be assisted by an adviser of the opposite
religion; that there should be a General Assembly composed of
a majority of Christians which would sit from forty to sixty
days; that Greek should be the official language, and that the
1
natives should have the preference for official posts.
Under these conditions Crete remained quiet for over
a decade, but the desire to unite with Greece was always present,
and in 1889 a revolt broke out to accomplish this purpose.
Greece tried hard to discourage the inopportune movement, but
the ancient enmity between the Christians and the Turks had been
aroused and a religious struggle resulted. The Turks killed
many Christians and burnt their villages while the latter used
similar retaliatory measures. The Sultan sent troops to the
island and the Powers were urged to intervene, but the insurrec-
tion was quieted when Abdul Hamid issued the firman of November 24
1. Miller, W., The Ottoman Empire 1801-1913 , p. 410.
2. Ibid-, p. 432.

This was unsatisfactory to the Christians as it practically
repealed the Pact of Halipa and favored the Moslems, but they
were forced to yield.
^
In 1895 the Sultan was forced to bow before the
demands of the Christian majority in Crete, and he appointed a
Christian Governor General and summoned a new Assembly with a
majority of Christians. The Turks were now determined not to
accept Christian rule and they began to create riots and murder
the Greeks. A bitter situation arose and the Sultan deposed
the Christian Governor and replaced him with a Mussulman. This
displeased both parties, as the Turks desired a military
governor, and great tension between the parties resulted.
On May 34, 1896, an insurrection broke out and there
was a conflict in the streets of Canea between the Moslems and
the Greeks. 3 Abdul Hamid was alarmed at this internal dissension
and accepted, too late, the advice of the Powers to restore the
Pact of Halipa and appoint a Christian Governor. In addition
he agreed to have two European commissioners to organize the
gendarmerie and reform the tribunals. 4 The Mussulmans considered
this only a subterfuge of the Sultan and would not take the
arrangement seriously, although it was satisfactory to the
Christians.
The action of the Turks and the delay of the Sultan
in carrying out the proposed reforms made the Greeks also doubt
the sincerity of the arrangement. On February 4, 1897, a
1. Encyclopedia Britannica, 11th Edition, Volume 37, p. 463.
3. Miller, W. , Ottoman Empire, 1801-1913, p. 433.
3. Ibid., p. 433.
4. Ibid., p. 434.
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Moslem outbreak occurred in Canea and a large part of the
Christian quarter burned. The hostility between the two
religious groups was immediately aroused and the civil war was
renewed. Both sides began to arm in serious preparations for
war and the Christians seized the "peninsula" between Canea and
Suda Bay (Akroteri ) and proclaimed their union with the Greeks.
In this civil struggle between the two races of Crete
barbarities were perpetrated by both parties. Christians and
Mussulmans were massacred in the most revolting manner but from
the accounts of the period it seems that the Turks were the worst
offenders. The correspondent of the London Times gave irrefut-
able testimony of the cruelties of the Moslems. Minute accounts
of the sacking of the Monastery of St. John near Herakaleion
were reported by this eye-witness. One incident described is
particularly revolting. The High Priest of the Monastery was
seized by the Turks and roasted to death on a fire made of the
sacred Eikons of the church.
3
In the middle of August, Akroteri
was sacked by the Moslems, and Christians were massacred
irrespective of their age or sex.
The course of events in Crete and the atrocities of
the Turks aroused great excitement in Greece, and the whole
nation demanded intervention. The government was unable to
resist the popular clamor and on February 15, 1897, a Greek
force under Colonel Vassos was sent to occupy Crete and in the
name of King George to restore order and drive the Turks from
1. Miller., W., The Ottoman Empire 1801-1915. p. 433.
2. London Times, July and August 1896.
3. London Times, August 21, 1896.

the forts, 1 A fleet was also sent to prevent the landing of
Turkish reenforcements
.
The interference of the Greeks and the crisis it
brought on, caused the Powers to take immediate action. On
February 15th the admirals of the five Powers, whose ships were
then in Cretan waters, took possession of Canea. When the
insurgents attacked the Turkish troops near Akroteri, the fleet
of the Powers forced them to desist by bombarding their position.'
This action of the Powers caused intense indignation in Greece
and was severely ciriticized in England. The English people were
disgusted that the fleet should have fired upon fellow Christians
in order to protect the fiendish Turks, whom they felt to be the
3
oppressors.
A note was sent by the Powers to the Christians in
Crete promising them autonomy if. they required the withdrawal of
4
the Greek fleet and army, but it met with an unfavorable reply.
The admirals of the fleet, however, issued a proclamation of
autonomy in spite of the action of the Cretans. They enforced
this by blockading the island and showed that their intentions
5
were sericus by again bombarding the insurgents at Maxala. In
England the policy of the Allies became increasingly unpopular.
The people felt that the best solution of the Cretan problem
would be the total expulsion of the Turks from the island.
1. Miller, W. , The Ottoman Empire 1801-1913 . p. 434.
2. Ibid., p. 434.
~~
„ „
__ Q
3. Godkin, E. L. , "Crete in England", The Nation, Vol. 64, p. 319.
4. The Spectator, Vol. 78, p. 88.
5. Miller, Ibid., p. 435.

One writer strongly urged this policy on the grounds that the
strength and importance of the Turks in Crete was greatly over-
estimated. He asserted that there were only about thirty
thousand Moslems on the island and that these were gradually
shrinking in number, power, and wealth.
1
The allies could not,
however, see the wisdom of such a course, and Germany was
especially opposed to any decrease of the Sultan 1 s power.
Meanwhile the public sentiment in Greece had become
as
so strongly forcedA to make preparations for
war with Turkey.
Xing George probably expected the Powers to interfere and stop
the impending struggle, but this was not done. The Powers
attempted to settle the question by diplomacy, but the Greeks
2
were so aroused that war became inevitable.
Early in April armed bands of Greeks crossed the
frontier into Macedonia and several skirmishes were fought there
and in Thessaly. On April 17, 1897, Turkey declared war on
Greece.
3
Austria and Russia forced the Balkan States to remain
neutral in this struggle, and Greece was left to oppose Turkey
4
alone. The war lasted only about a month, and was very
disastrous to the Greeks. They were defeated everywhere on land,
and their fleet was prevented from capturing Turkish island
possessions by the orders of the Powers. By the middle of May
Greece was totally crushed and the Concert intervened to save
1. Ypsilantis, "Situation in Crete?- Contemporary Review, Vol. 70
p. 323. (This is, of course, an opinion from the Greek point
2. Gardner^E., "Greek Sentiment for Crete,"- Saturday Review,
Vol. 83, p. 466.
3. Encyclopedia Britannica, Eleventh Edition, Vol. 27, p. 4rf«5.
4. Miller, W. , The Ottoman Empire 1801-1913 , p. 436.
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her from further humiliation. The Greeks withdrew all of their
forces from Crete, and on December 4, a treaty of peace was
concluded at Constantinople,
The treaty of peace was dictated by the Powers and
gave Turkey very small territorial concessions.
1 Greece lost a
part of Thessaly and was forced to pay a war indemnity of five
million pounds. Representatives of the six Powers were to form
a commission to supervise "the collection and employment of
revenues sufficient for the service of the war indemnity loan
and the other national debts". The terms of this treaty were
arranged only after a long diplomatic struggle between England
and Germany. Germany was by this time the acknowledged champion
of the Sultan, and she seemed unwilling to agree that the
Turkish troops should evacuate Thessaly. The German Emperor
only agreed to this arrangement when Lord Salisbury of England
agreed to the above terms in regard to the war indemnity. The
terms of peace were a distinct diplomatic victory for the
Emperor, but Lord Salisbury was practically forced to agree, for
further disagreement meant continued suffering to the Greeks
4
and Christians.
During the interval between May 19 and December 4,
the diplomatic efforts of the Powers were bitterly attacked by
the newspapers and magazines of England. The Spectator of
October 16, declared that there was no chance for the solution
1. Miller, W., The Ottoman Empire 1801-1913 , p. 437.
2. Ibid., p. 438.
3. Spectator, Vol. 78, p. 292.
4. Ibid., Vol. 79, p. 485.

of the Cretan question while the Powers continued the action they
were then pursuing.
1
"Disease, hunger and a habit of murder
from revenge are up to the present time the fruits of the
combined action of the European Powers," was the bitter comment
made by the editor.
8
He urged that the following measures be
adopted by the Concert: (l) Turkey should be made to evacuate
Crete; (3) autonomous government should be established in Crete
and Turkish influence entirely abolished; (3) a gendarmerie
should be established to maintain order; (4) a loan of two
hundred thousand pounds should be raised by the Powers to assist
3
the country until it should be again on a sound basis.
This scheme might have been a very sound one, but there
were several factors which were certain to interfere with its
success. The most important of these was the intensely jealous
rivalry between the members of the Concert. Germany was especial-
ly stubborn, and seemed determined to block all possibilities of
a settlement. As stated before, it was only after England gave
way that the treaty was concluded.
Even after the treaty of peace, the question was not
near a final settlement. Although the Sultan had agreed to
withdraw his troops from Thessaly he made no move to do so, and
the Powers took no active steps to force him. As before,
Germany acted as his protector. It was only after Germany and
Austria withdrew from the Concert in its action on the Cretan
1. Spectator, Vol. 79, p. 513.
3. Ibid., p. 514.
3. Ibid., p. 514.

question, during the early months of 1898, that the troops were
finally withdrawn.
1
It was difficult for the remaining Powers of the
the
Concert to agree upon a fit candidate for^ ruler of autonomous
Crete. While they were attempting to select a candidate, each
country took a portion of Crete under its protection and all
3
four occupied Canea.
On September 6, 1898 an attack was made upon the
British in Canea by the Turks, and this led to the quick settle-
ment of the question. Admiral Noel used severe measures to
punish the offending Turks, and in two months the island was
cleared of Moslems. 3 On November 26 the representatives of the
four Powers finally determined upon Prince George of Greece as
4
High Commissioner of autonomous Crete for a term of three years.
Each Power agreed to advance forty thousand pounds to meet the
initial expenses of the government.
Prince George was very popular in Crete and he provided
a constitutional government for the people. "For the first time
for nineteen hundred years," wrote an enthusiastic Athenian
journalist, "Crete possesses a completely autonomous government."
Gradually the Powers withdrew their troops from Crete and left
the people to rule themselves.
For six years affairs moved quietly in Crete but in
1905 another crisfcs arose when Greece feared that Crete might
1. Miller, I., _The_0ttoman Empire ,1801^1913, p. 438.
3. Encyclopedia Britannica, Eleventh Edition, Vol. 27, p. 4^4.
3. Miller, Ibid, p. 435.
4. Ibid., p. 435.
5. Ibid., p. 440.

become a principality like Samoa and no longer wish union with
her. An insurgent government was formed in Crete which declared
a union between Crete and Greece. The Powers intervened at this
stage and forced the surrender of the insurgents. Prince George
was now weary of Cretan politics and resigned his office of
High Commissioner. The Powers permitted King George to select
the new ruler and a Greek conservative, M. Alexander Za'imes,
was appointed. Under his rule there was me more heard from
Crete until after the Revolution of 1908.
The action of the European Concert in the Cretan
problem was not very successful and was bitterly criticized by
the people of England. That much of its power was destroyed
by the lack of harmony among its members was again demonstrated,
but its action also showed that the long process of diplomacy .
which it used was antiquated and ineffective. Too much time
was consumed to accomplish small results.

IV
The Macedonian Question.
The Cretan question had hardly been disposed of by the
Powers before they were forced to interfere in a situation far
more perplexing than any they had yet faced. This was the
Macedonian crisis.
Macedonia was a province in European Turkey whose
most important characteristic was its conflicting races and
overlapping claims. Greeks, Bulgarians, Serbs, and Kcutzo-
Wallachs lived within its boundaries and formed a very turbulent
population. Religious quarrels and racial hatreds constantly
produced small outbreaks among the various races.
The Treaty of Berlin in 1878 made Macedonia the natural
direction of expansion for all the Balkan States.
1 Servia,
Roumania, Bulgaria, and Greece were all cut off from other
directions of growth by the greater Powers of Europs, and so they
naturally looked toward Macedonia, peopled,at least partially,
by their own race. Both Austria-Hungary and Turkey were glad to
perceive this movement, as it would play off one of the Balkan
States against the other and so distract attention from their
policies and territory. The Turkish government realized that
the greater the confusion of the races in Macedonia, the better
chance they had of retaining the province.
1. Hazen, C. D. , Europe since 1815 , p. 635.
2. Miller, W., The Ottoman Empire 1801-1913, p. 443.

Abdul Hamid*8 policy in regard to Macedonia was very
unpopular among the Powers, and later became disliked by the
Turks themselves. Sir Edwin Pears says that "With his miserable
ideas of statesmanship, Abdul Hamid would do nothing bat play
off Greeks against the Bulgars?
1 Every year conditions became
worse and the Sultan did not attempt to remove the bone of
contention.
In his book of memoirs of his life in Turkey, Sir Edwin
Pears writes that the following facts of the Macedonian case
were known in Constantinople in 1898: (l) no security for life
or property existed there; (3) Turkish soldiers continually
plundered Bulgarian and occasionally Greek villages; (3) the
brigands of both parties continued to devastate the country;
(4) thousands of Macedonians fled from the country and emigrated
to Bulgaria or Servia; (5) that the Turkish authorities usually
favored the Greeks in all controversies; (6) the national feeling
among the various sections ran very high. Especially was there
3
great hatred between the Greeks and the Bulgarians.
The results of the misgovernment of Macedonia were
disastrous. A vast emigration took place from the various
sections of the country. The consular reports of 1904 show that
in that year three thousand men crossed the Atlantic from the
vilayet of Monastir alone. By 1905 five thousand' had gone, and
early in 1906 the number had reached fifteen thousand. In ten
villages around Fiorina, only women and children were left to
till the soil.
1. Pears, Sir Edwin., Forty Years in Constantinople , p. 196.
3. Ibid-, p. 195.
3. Ibid., p. 300.
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The Greek war of 189? seemed an excellent opportunity
to unite the Christian races of the Balkans against the Turks,
but Austria and Russia prevented the interference of the larger
states and so stifled the Macedonian question for the time
being.
In 1899 a Macedonian Committee sitting at Sofia sent
a memorial to the Powers, which advocated the formation of an
1
autonomous province of Macedonia with Salonika as its capital.
The Governor-General was to be selected from the predominant
race, which the committee thought would be the Bulgarians, An
autonomous Macedonia with a Bulgarian Governor-General, it was
felt, would be a great step towards the big Bulgaria of the
Treaty of San Stefano. This memorial, however, accomplished
nothing, and warlike measures began to be taken by the party of
action.
The Bulgarian bands took the field against the Turks,
and crossed the frontier to attack them. They also made an
attack upon a Roumanian professor, and Roumania immediately
demanded punishment of the committee. The Powers and the Sultan
stepped into the dispute and arrested the leading men of the
committee. They were, however, all acquitted because the court
was under the influence of Bulgarian public opinion.
Conditions in Macedonia were now so bad that even the
Turks began to complain. Mr. Berard, a Frenchman, described
Macedonia as "a country of pillage and massacres, producing
nothing for its inhabitants, and useless for the rest of the
world, uninhabitable for the natives, and impenetrable for
foreigners"
1. Miller, Ottapan Empire , p. 444. 2. Ibid, p. 445.
3, Pears, Sir idwTH77grtY Years ip Consja^t^fi^e , P«^_20Sk

Ixi the midst of these conditions Sir Nicholas 0» Conor
1 e4
was sent to Constantinople to replace Sir Philip Currie. Sir
Nicholas was a very conscientious man and was always careful, in
the Macedonian question, not to take the side of either the
Bulgarians or the Greeks. What he did care for, and worked hard
to obtain, was security for life and property, and even-handed
justice. England and France urged the Porte to execute some
reforms in Macedonia, and pointed out in strenuous terms that
the province would be lost to Turkey if such reforms were not
adopted.
Abdul Hamid finally yielded to this advice and appointed
Ailmi Pasha to investigate the condition of Macedonia and
recommend reforms. Hilmi Pasha was a Turk with an honest
reputation and his investigation was very thorough, and his
recommendations complete and practical. The Sultan, however,
paid no attention to the report and left matters as they were.
In February 1903 a modest scheme of reforms for these
Macedonian vilayets of Salonika, Monastir, and Kossovo was
proposed by Austria-Hungary and Russia, and supported by the
Powers. This plan was divided into three parts: (l) the Sultan
was to appoint an Inspector General for a fixed number of years;
(3) the gendarmer ie of Macedonia were to be composed of Christians
and Moslems, in proportion to their respective nuntoers; and (3)
a separate budget for each of these vilayets was to be estab-
lished. The Sultan accepted this scheme of reform .but it
increased the disorder in the provinces without solving the
U Spectator, Vol. 80, p. 328.
2. Miller, W. , The Ottoman Empire 1801-1913 , p. 446.

question. All of the races mistrusted the others, and fearing
for their own liberties, continued in rebellion.
In October 1903, Russia and Austria issued a second
edition of their reform scheme, called the Murzsteg programme.
This plan was also accepted by the Sultan and provided that
Austrian and Russian civil officers should become attaches of the
Inspector General; that the reorganization of the gendarmerie
should be entrusted to a foreign general, aided by military
officers of the Powers, who would divide Macedonia among them;
and that reforms of the administrative and judicial institutions
of the country should be brought about, with the participation of
the Christians, 1
As a result of this plan all of the Powers except
Germany, sent a contingent of officers to Macedonia, and each
country exercised police control over a given district or
secteur .
3
The great flaw in this arrangement lay in the fact that
the worst sections of Macedonia were not included in the plan.
In England there was an active interest in this complex
problem. There was, however, a division of opinion among the
people as to which race was to blame for the disorders. Each
party in Macedonia desired to get the public sympathy and so
always blamed their enemies for all disturbances. The Bulgarians
blamed Greek intrigue for the unrest in Macedonia, while the
Greeks said it was caused by the continued interference of the
Bulgarians. Active measures were taken by a British committee
1. Miller, W., The Ottoman Empire 1801-1913 , p. 446.
2. Ibid., p. 447.
3. London Times, October 31, 1902, p. 6.
t.
to relieve the distress of the harassed people, and they accomp-
lished a great deal of good.
Meanwhile the condition of affairs in the Balkans was
becoming worse instead of better. The national quarrels spread
beyond Macedonia, and the various Balkan countries began to be
actively involved. The Bulgarians and the Roumanians demonstrated
against the Greeks, and the common danger of Greece and Servia
caused these two to become firm allies.
By this time the failure of the Murzsteg scheme was so
evident that the British government proposed in 1905 the
appointment of a commission of delegates by the Powers to frame
financial reforms. 1 The Sultan absolutely refused to permit
foreign interference in his finances but the Concert used
coercive measures to gain his consent. On November 26 the allied
fleet occupied the custom-house and telegraph-office at Mitylene
and on December 6 they occupied the Kastro of Lemnos. Abdul
Hamid then consented to recognize the four financial experts
sent by the Powers to assist the Austrian and Russian civil
agents provided for in the Murzsteg programme.
In spite of all these measures the state of affairs in
Macedonia became worse and worse. England urged as a final
measure that the gendarmerie be increased, but the other Powers
would not cooperate with her.
3 Sir Edward Grey protested against
the continued passage of Greek and Bulgarian bands into Macedonia,
and secured the recall of several active propagandists by the
1. Miller, W., The Ottoman Empire 1801-1913 , p. 448.
3. Spectator, Vol. 95, p. 506.
3. Miller, Ibid., p. 448

Greek and Bulgarian governments, but England could not hope to
accomplish much without the assistance of the other Powers.
In summing up the results of the interference of the
Concert in Macedonia we must conclude that, as in the other cases
it was largely ineffective. The action of the Powers did result
in some financial reforms, and fewer outrages were perpetrated
by the Turkish troops, but the great problem of stopping the
struggle between the races of Macedonia was left unsolved. In
fact the struggles between the Greeks, Bulgaria, and Koutzo-
Wallaohs had become more bitter in 1908 that ever before.
The year 1908 does not conclude the Macedonian problem
but at this time it becomes involved in the Turkish revolution
and we can follow its most important phases to better advantage
when considering that great event.

The Turkish Revolution of 1908,
In the Bummer of 1908 the Eastern Question entered
upon a new and startling phase. In July a swift and almost
bloodless revolution occurred in Turkey, which forced Abdul
Hamid to grant a libsral constitution to his subjects.
For many years there had been a great deal of
dissatisfaction among the Turks with the policies of the Sultan,
but lack of organization had prevented any action. About 1890,
however, a "committee" of Turkish exiles and men who had fled
from the Sultanas tyranny was organized in Paris. This committee
worked with great secrecy, and as the people became more and
more dissatisfied it greatly increased in power. In 1905 another
committee was established in Salonika. These organized bodies
wished to overthrow the despotic government of Abdul Hamid, and
restore to Turkey the Constitution of 1876. By great secrecy
and brilliant strategy the "Young Turks" were successful in
winning over to their party many prominent people of Turkey and,
most important of all, the army.
The leaders of the revolutionary party planned their
coup d'etat with such secrecy that none of the Powers or the
Sultan had any idea of their strength or plans. It was origin-
ally planned that the revolution was to occur upon August 31,
the anniversary of Abdul Hamid 1 s accession to the throne, but
the fear of further foreign intervention in Macedonia and the
1. An approximate date. The movement was a gradual one and I
selected an arbitrary date.

preparation which the Sultan was making to crush the new movement,
caused the date to be advanced.
1
On July 21 or 22, 1908 a telegram was sent from
Monastir to Yildiz demanding the re-establishment of the
Constitution of 1876 or the abdication of the Sultan. The tele-
gram further stated that the troops which had revolted from
the
Sultan, practically the whole army, had sworn not to lay
down
2
their arms until the Constitution was established.
Abdul Hamid hesitated for some time to accept the
ultimatum of the revolutionists, but the latter had such
absolute
control of all phases of the situation that the Sultan
was forced
to give in. On July 24, the Sultan issued a decree
which
announced the restoration of the Constitution of 1876.
The
censorship of the press and the spy system were abolished,
and a
Chamber of Deputies of two hundred and eighty members was
summoned to meet.
The news of the successful revolution of the Young
Turks was received with tremendous enthusiasm throughout
the
Turkish Empire. Insurgents and soldiers, Mohammedans and
Christians, Greeks, Serbs, Bulgarians, Armenians, Albanians,
and
Turks were all delighted with the release from the tyranny
of
Abdul Hamid. Great celebrations were held in which
religious and
social differences were forgotten, and a remarkable
fraternal
spirit was shown by the once bitterly hostile elements.
Every-
where it was proclaimed that the Revolution meant liberty,
1. Miller, W., The Ottoman Empire 1801-1913, p.
474.
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equality, and fraternity,
1
In a public assembly Mohammedan
mollahs and Christian priests united in praying for the souls
of the people killed in the Armenian massacres. It seemed
probable that this remarkable revolution would be the final,
though unexpected, solution of the intricate Eastern Question.
The popularity of Great Britain was clearly shown
during this period. Not only the Armenians, Greeks, and
Bulgarians demonstrated in favor of England ^but even the
Turks
were unanimously for her. She had adopted a fair and
liberal
policy in regard to the Eastern Question, and in addition
was
felt to be the great exponent of democracy. When Sir
Gerard
Lowther, the English ambassador to Turkey, arrived in
Constantinople on July 30, he was given a tremendous ovation
by
the Turks.
3
In England and all the other European countries
the popular opinion was strongly in favor of the Young
Turks.
The success of the revolution caused the leaders of the
movement to increase their demands, and a sweeping chang© in the
whole administration was gradually made. The Committee of
Union and Progress began to make searching investigation
into
the corruptness of the officials, and some ministers were
forced
to repay their embezzled funds. The new party seemed
determined
to give Turkey a clean and efficient government.
The great results accomplished by the new government
inspired the Powers with such confidence that they
determined
1. Pears, Sir Edwin, Forty Years InC^tf^ffig P# 23?#
3. Miller, W., The Ottoman Empire 1801-191,3, P.
3. Pears, Ibid., p. 238.
4. London Times, July and August 1908.

assumed the title of King. On October 7, the Greek population
of Crete repudiated all connection with Turkey and declared for
union with Greece. On the same day Emperor Francis Joseph issued
a proclamation to the people of Bosnia and Herzegovina announcing
the annexation of these provinces to Austria-Hungary.
1
These actions of the various countries carried
tremendous excitement among the great powers. All of these
measures were violent breaches of the Treaty of Berlin and the
crisis brought all of the members of the Concert upon the scene.
It became evident very quickly that the Powers would be unable to
agree upon a policy to be adopted.
Germany at onoe threw in her lot with Austria and
2 .
made it clear that she would support her. Italy also seemed
likely to do the same, as her Minister of Foreign Affairs, Signor
Tittoni, described the annexation of the two provinces as merely
the destruction of "a diplomatic fiction".
3
The three Powers
of the Triple Alliance thus stood together, and they were able
to defy the other nations.. Great Britain and France were unwill-
ing and unable to go to war with the two great military monarchies
of Central Europe, and Russia was unable to join them. She was
still crippled in resources from the war with Japan and was
moreover bound by a recent treaty with Austria to consent to the
4
annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
Servia was very indignant at the action of Austria,
because she felt that Bosnia and Herzegovina should rightfully
Xm Hazen, C. D., Europe since 1815 , p. 539.
2. Ibid., p. 640.
_
3. Miller, W., The Ottoman Empire 1801-1913, p. 478.
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to remove all phases of foreign control from Macedonia. The
foreign officers were recalled and the International Commission
fo Finance was abolished. 1 The new government was left to act
for itself and the Powers placed so much confidence in it that the
affirmation was made that "the Macedonian question and others of
.
2
a similar character will entirely disappear".
Thus far the members of the Concert had acted in
unison and in agreement with the wishes of the Young Turks, but
in another phase of the situation, complications arose, which
for a time threatened a general European war. The action of
the Powers in evacuating Macedonia encouraged the new government
to hope that the Concert would not interfere any further in
Turkish affairs, but this hope was futile.
The rapid occurrence of events in July took the members
of the concert by surprise, but they immediately began to take
a vital interest in each development. The great question which
confronted them was the possible attitude which a reformed and
strengthened Turkey might take towards Bosnia, Herzegovina,
Bulgaria, Crete, Cyprus, and possibly Egypt. Would she attempt
to recover possession of these nominal provinces? There is little
evidence that the Young Turks even dreamed of such a policy for
they desired, first of all, the non-interference of the Powers.
The excuse which this possibility offered, however, was taken
advantage of by some of the Powers, to further their own desires.
On October 5, Prince Ferdinand of Bulgaria proclaimed
the complete independence of Bulgaria from Turkish suzerainty and
1. Miller, W., The Ottoman Empire 1801-1913 , p. 477.
2. Ibid., p. 476.
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belong to her, inaamuch as their population was largely Serbian,
For a short time it seemed that she would declare war upon Austria
in spite of the terrific odds against her, but the action of
Germany forced her to accept the conditions. Turkey also
protested strongly against the infractions of her rights, but did
not commit any warlike acts.
Although England, France, and Russia realized that they
could not prevent these violations of the Treaty of Berlin,
particularly the action of Austria, they felt that they could not
consent to them without serious loss of prestige. A tremendous
interchange of diplomatic notes ensued
1
and gradually the
situation cleared.
Sir Edward Grey, the British Foreign Minister,
announced that Great Britain could not admit "the right of any
Power to alter an international treaty without the consent of the
other parties to it, and it, therefore, refuses to sanction any
infractions of the Berlin Treaty and declines to recognize what
has been done until the views of the other Powers are known,
especially those of Turkey, which is more directly concerned than
• 3
any one else".
This suggestion by England of an honorable way out of
the crisis was accepted by Turkey and the other countries
involved. Austria-Hungary announced that she would not give up
Bosnia and Herzegovina but that she was willing to compensate
Turkey for her loss. Turkey agreed to accept a cash indemnity
1. It is impossible to secure the official documents of any
reliable accounts of this diplomacy to date.
2. Hazen, C. D, , Europe since 1815 , p. 641.
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from Austria and made a similar arrangement with Bulgaria.
1 The
Greeks decided that their opportunity was not yet ripe to realize
their hopes and so gave up the plan of annexing Crete. These
arrangements were probably the best that could be secured by
England and her allies under the existing circumstances, but the
3
people of England were highly dissatisfied with the whole affair.
They felt that Germany was assuming too great an importance in
the affaire of Europe, and were indignant, that the English
government was obliged, as they did in reality, to accept her
terms. It was evident to all that Germany was rapidly displacing
England as the predominant factor in Turkish affairs and the
Eastern Question.
The settlement of this crisis in 1908 marks the last
action of the European Concert as a recognized diplomatic body.
The evacuation of Macedonia by the Powers showed that at last it
was thought the Turks would be able to manage their own affairs.
This action, however, was caused by underlying forces which were
not clearly stated. By 1908 the two rival groups of the Triple
Alliance and the Triple Entente had firmly organized, and as their
interests were rapidly becoming more and more separated it was
finally realized that a Concert of these two alliances could never
bring about unified action. Individual instances of unified
action by the various ambassadors at Constantinople are undoubted-
ly to be found since 1908 but as a whole the historic European
Concert in Turkey has disappeared.
1. Hazen, C. D, , Europe since 1815 , p. 641. Austro-Turkish
agreement signed on February 26, 1909.
3. The London Times, October, 1908. (Editorials dealing upon the
subject found in almost every issue of this month after the
8th.
)
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